Whereas conventionally designed information systems provide information via a computerised display, in everyday life, our actions are informed by information obtained from a variety of places in a variety of ways. Drawing on conventional IS, Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), ecological psychology and sociology, and building on existing work on situated information systems, this paper explores the idea of obtaining information from the environment to accomplish workplace activity in a routine way. A typology of conceptually distinct sources of information is presented and this has implications for what we understand information systems to be. Just as Hutchins refers to his conception of cognition as 'cognition in the wild' (Hutchins, 1995), so we can conceive of situated information systems 'in the wild' rather than confined to computational space. The argument with respect to information systems analysis and design is that abstract representations should not be the only option considered. Using the information source that is most appropriate given the particular context of the actor and the environment will better support the accomplishment of collective routines, increasing efficiency and effectiveness.
Introduction
Information systems are traditionally designed by creating an abstract representation of the relevant real-world entities. Indeed Weber (2003, p. viii) has concluded that 'representation' is 'the essence of all information systems'. However, as repeatedly pointed out by Claudio Ciborra (1994 Ciborra ( , 1996 Ciborra ( , 1998 Ciborra ( , 2002 , a major flaw of information systems designed on the basis of an abstract formulation of the entities involved is that these information systems regularly fail to support activity in the real world. Whereas
Weber justified the focus on abstract representations by claiming that the representation of the system was less costly than observing the system itself, this paper follows Johnston et al (2005) in suggesting that there are times when it is more efficient or effective to obtain information directly from the environment, rather than rely on a representation.
The idea of information support from the environment is explored systematically resulting in a suggested typology of the various sources of information that an actor can use in routine activity. This has implications for what we understand information systems to be. Just as Hutchins refers to his conception of cognition as 'cognition in the wild' (Hutchins, 1995) , so we can conceive of situated information systems 'in the wild' rather than confined to computational space. The main argument of the paper is that abstract representations should not be the only option considered in information systems analysis and design, particularly where the prime purpose is to support workplace activity. Using the information source that is most appropriate given the particular context of the actor and the environment will enable information systems to better support the accomplishment of collective routines, increasing human efficiency and effectiveness. Indeed, in Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) there has been a turn away from abstract computation with approaches such as social computing, tangible computing and pervasive computing taking explicit account of the social and physical environment.
These developments could provide an important contribution to IS design.
The structure of this paper is as follows. It begins with an illustration of how, in everyday life, we obtain information from a variety of types of sources. It then turns to a theoretical justification for obtaining information from the environment in the programme of developing a situated approach to information systems analysis and design (Johnston et al 2005) . Drawing on work in sociology of knowledge (Barnes 2001) and Artificial
Intelligence (Agre 1997) , it then illustrates the importance of information support from the environment in order for collective work to be achieved in a routine way. Although Agre and Barnes both implicitly describe the environment as a source of information for action, neither of them have clearly articulated what information from the environment is, why it can be thought of as 'information' and how it is similar to or different from what we conventionally accept as information. This paper addresses these issues in developing a typology of the various sources of information that an actor can use in routine activity.
Using a combination of real and constructed examples, the case is presented for explicitly taking account of the environment in the analysis and design of information systems in order to better support workers in accomplishing collective routines. It is pointed out how some less conventional information system design approaches do already make use of other information sources. We conclude by indicating the potential of various approaches within HCI to provide new means for locating information in the environment.
Everyday ways of obtaining information from the environment
Whereas conventionally designed information systems provide information via a computerised display, in everyday life, our actions are informed by information sourced from a variety of places in a variety of ways. Take the example of a woman who lives near the beach and goes for a surf each morning. In principle, there are a variety of different ways in which she may pick up information from the environment about where to go surfing that morning. For example she could consult a map forecasting wave height or water temperature for that day. She may have a written description of good surfing spots. She may just head out to the beach and have a look around. Looking out across the water, she may visually detect the presence of a rip adjacent to nicely breaking waves.
She can enter the water there to make use of the rip to head out beyond the break. Or it could be that a lifesaver advises her not to enter the water or she sees a red flag on the beach (a red flag on the beach indicates 'Beach closed -do not enter'). She may have to find a secluded spot because she knows that the locals deem it unacceptable for a woman to surf (as was the situation in Australia until the 1980s). She may tune into the surf report on the radio at 8.10am. And so on. The exact information conveyed by each of these sources is different, but in each case, the woman is provided with the information she needs, information about where is a suitable place to go surfing that morning. This example will be revisited later in the article as a means of illustrating conceptually distinct types of information source that can be used to support the accomplishment of collective routines in the workplace.
2 Situated systems: an alternative approach to information systems analysis and design Although, in practice, IS professionals may make use of the environment, conventional IS methodologies have ignored the environment as an information resource (Johnston et al., 2005) . Johnston et al (2005) provide a theoretical justification as to why information systems should explicitly take account of the environment. In the programme of research towards developing a situated systems methodology, Johnston and Milton (2002; demonstrate that conventional information systems are informed by a particular model of human action, the deliberative. Arguing that most routine activity is situated, rather than deliberative, they suggest that information systems informed by a situated model of action will be more effective in supporting routine activity. Johnston and Milton outline some methodological principles for the design of a situated information system. In particular, they argue that the environment provides constraints on the shape that activities can take as well as opportunities for undertaking different types of activities to achieve goals. They suggest that the environment should be restructured, making use of environmental opportunities and constraints, in order that goals are achieved more effectively and efficiently. However, whereas Johnston et al (2005) starts with a theory of action, this paper starts with a practical discussion of information in support of action, that is, how people pick up information in the environment to achieve collective routines. So while Johnston et al focuses on the 'how'
and 'why' of designing a situated system, this paper focuses on 'what', in principle, a situated information system might look like, and how it might differ from conventionally designed IS.
Collective routines: the need for information support from the environment
The following section draws from Agre (1997) and Barnes' (2001) understanding of routines, to argue that 'routine' is defined by the way an activity is accomplished rather than the intrinsic nature of the tasks involved. Moreover, it is demonstrated that in order to accomplish an activity as a collective routine, information support from the environment is required. Agre (1997) distinguishes between industrial routines where an activity is deliberately shaped to have prescribed sequences of action and emergent routines which he describes as 'a frequently repeated pattern of interaction between an agent and its familiar environment'. As Agre's purpose is to reorient Artificial Intelligence towards activity in the world, his interest is in this type of emergent routine as a way to describe the actions of the individual in a fairly stable environment. For example, a person may drive to work each morning in the same fashion, always slowing down before particular potholes and always lighting a cigarette at a particular intersection where traffic is built up and the lights are slow to change. The driver may not even be aware that he does this, until a passenger comments on these aspects of the drive. The noteworthy aspect of these emergent routines is that the structure of the environment supports the activity, such that it tends to be done without the need for thought. For Agre, the routine is not because of a plan in the agent's head to do things the same way, it is to do with the stability of the environment.
But what if the environment changes? Of course, if the potholes get fixed, the driver will no longer need to slow down at these places, and if the traffic conditions at the intersection change, the driver may choose to light his cigarette somewhere else along the drive. According to Agre, the individual will gradually respond to changes in their environment such that a new or evolved routine will emerge.
Barnes (2001) is interested in shared work practices and so explicitly includes other people in his conception of a routine, making it more than just the observable emergent pattern in a stable environment. According to Barnes, a routine includes 'constant active modification of what comes automatically or habitually ' (2001, p. 24) . In the case of someone driving to work, in addition to slowing down at potholes and lighting a cigarette at a particular intersection, the driver will be responding to the road conditions and the individual actions of other drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians. Moreover, the situation becomes more complex once there is more than one actor involved in performing the routine; for example, in workplaces where activity is coordinated between more than one person. Barnes refers to these cases as collective routines and considers that these collective routines are more than just the sum of individual routines.
To give an example of an activity that is routine at the collective level, but not routine at the individual level, Barnes discusses the activity of riding in formation. In order to ride in formation, each rider has to take account of variations in terrain, monitor the actions of others and adapt accordingly, 'even perhaps imagining future scenarios, for example the consequences of a possible slow-down at the front as a slope is encountered, well before they occur ' (2001, p. 23) . Hence, in order to perform a collective routine, the individuals have to continually coordinate and align their actions as the immediate environment changes around them.
A point to note about Barnes' example is that ordinarily, and in daylight, no special effort is needed to ensure that the individuals are able to access all the information they need to be able to successfully ride in formation. As each rider can see the person in front of them, the terrain underfoot and the terrain ahead, no additional information support is needed. Of course, it would be a different case entirely if it was pitch black.
Then perhaps each individual would have to respond to verbal instructions or consult a small electronic display to see a representation of the other riders and the terrain.
Without referring explicitly to information, the work of Agre and Barnes illustrates the importance of the environment in providing information to actors involved in routines. Agre shows how people automatically respond to information about the environment. Barnes shows how the performance of collective routines requires realtime information about how the immediate environment is changing.
In the case of coordinating activity in the workplace, people may not have ready access to all the information they need to perform their duties. It may be difficult or time-consuming to access, or not available in a timely fashion. Without ready access to this information, the work may require more effort, is likely to be more time-consuming and the quality may suffer. This is in contrast to when information support enables routinisation, that is, accomplishment of a collective routine.
The suggestion in this paper is that the environment can be deliberately structured so that collective routines do not emerge over time but can be accomplished through careful design of an information system. In other words, the information systems can provide support for the performance of collective routines in organisations where that information is not naturally ready-to-hand.
Whereas both Agre's and Barnes' descriptions of routines are about obtaining information from the physical environment, this paper also explores other aspects of the environment that convey information. But first it needs to be established that we are justified in using the term 'information' to refer to what is conveyed by the environment.
Conventional conception of information as relational
Although Checkland and Holwell refer to information as a 'slippery' concept (1998, p. 84), a review of a range of IS textbooks led them to the conclusion that within IS, there is a fairly common view of the relationship between data and information. They found that, within IS, it is standard to assume that data are simply the mass of facts that exists and information is derived from data, such that information is data with meaning ascribed to it. This is very similar to the definition of information contained in the 1974
International Standards for data processing. (International Organization for Standardization, 1974 .) It should be noted that the view presented in textbooks does not necessarily reflect actual usage. As Checkland comments elsewhere, "all these terms are fuzzy as a result of their unreflective use in everyday chat" (1999, p. 46) . The blurring of the distinction between data and information is also evident in the use of these words by
IT companies (see for example IBM Corporation 2008).
Drawing from the Latin 'capere', meaning 'to take', Checkland and Holwell introduce the term 'capta', to refer to the subset of data that we select for attention.
These capta become information when we attribute some meaning to it by 'relat(ing) it to other things, put(ting) it in context, see(ing) it as part of a larger whole'. (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 89) Hence, the same capta yield different information to different people according to their intentions, moods (Ciborra, 2004) and history. So for example, juries are presented with data, some of which is accepted as evidence, and each jury member extracts information according to their mood, their background, their previous experiences and so on. This is why when presented with the same facts, individual jury members come to different conclusions. The idea that there is a one-to-many mapping between the data selected for attention and the information extracted is not new. It could be regarded as a version of the ideas of the early Sophists expressed in the well-known maxim that Plato attributed to Protagorus: "Man is the measure of all things". (Plato, 1953) . Woods sums up the relational aspect of information with the following statement:
"Information is not a thing-in-itself, but is rather a relation between the data, the world the data refers to, and the observer's expectations, intentions and interests" (1995, p. 176)
Abstract representations
Conventional information systems are computer-based and contain abstract symbolic data which represents something that occurs in the 'real' world, such as an object, an event, a transaction or an activity (for example, see conventional information systems described in Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003; Hirschheim et al., 1995; Stair and Reynolds, 1999) . Reed characterises these types of information source as cultural inventions, 'systematic surrogates for ecological information ' (1996, p. 178) . The same data can be used to represent a variety of real-world entities, but the data representing the one real-world entity can also take a variety of forms. For example, data on how much fuel is in a car could be in the form of numerals, words, colours, a picture of a fuel gauge, or even a computer-generated voice. Regardless of what form this data takes, it is still an abstract representation of the amount of fuel in the tank. In the absence of transparent petrol tanks visible from the driver's seat, it is more convenient to look at the data on the instrument panel than to directly look at how much petrol is in the tank. The representations are abstract in that their location in the environment does not affect potential meaning. This is in contrast to what will be referred to as situated representations.
Situated representations
A situated representation differs from an abstract representation in that a situated representation yields information by virtue of its symbolic meaning and its location. In other words, the information that it yields is more than just its symbolic content.
A situated representation is indexical (Agre, 1997) , that is, its meaning depends on the occasions of its use, for example the time or place. An exit sign is an example of a situated representation. The word "Exit" or the iconic picture of a green figure do not convey information about where an exit is unless they are situated in the relevant parts of a building. The information that an Exit sign yields is by virtue of its symbolic meaning and its location, taken together.
Similarly, a traffic light does not convey information unless it is situated where the traffic is to be regulated. In this case, the lit colour of the traffic light conveys information about whether to stop or go or slow down, while the position of the traffic light conveys information about where to stop or go or slow down. Paper flight strips are also situated representations. The scribbles and writing on the paper strip convey information as do their alignment in space (Mackay, 1999) . A real-time alert can be thought of as a situated representation, situated in time rather than space, with the alert, whether it be visual, aural or tactile, representing some type of event.
Many information systems that are not computer based use what can be thought of as situated representations. The Kanban, used in the automotive industry as a stock control system for parts, is an example of an information system relying on situated representations. As described in Milton et al (2004) , a Kanban is a card which has printed on it the product-ID, the primary supplier, and the work station where the part is to be used. However, rather than what is printed on it, it is the location of the card, such as on a board near the goods receiving area, or attached to a container, which conveys information about whether the part needs replenishment.
Ecological conception of information as relational

Physical environment
Whereas, in IS, the idea that information is provided by the environment to support action is unconventional, it is fundamental to ecological psychology.
Ecological psychology seeks to explain an individual actor's action with reference to observable properties of the actor's context or environment, rather than the actor's supposed inner mental state. The ecological psychologist, Gibson (1979) , introduced the idea of affordances, that is, features of the environment which enable or constrain action with respect to the capabilities and intentions of an actor.
Like the term information, the term 'affordance' presupposes attribution of meaning by an actor. Like information, it is a relational concept. An affordance is neither in the environment nor in an actor's head but consists in the relation between them. It is the structure of the environment that gives the possibility for action with regard to the actor's intention. As Heft puts it, "environmental features are experienced as having a functional meaning for the individual" (2001, p. 287). So for example, depending on an actor's intention, the physical properties of a hole in the ground mean that it could be a hiding place or something to be avoided. Similarly, properties of resistance and smoothness mean that the sand on a beach could be an affordance for walking on or for sleeping on, depending on the actor's intention.
For the argument in this paper, the crucial idea drawn from Gibson, is that the physical environment becomes a source of information as an actor perceives an invariant structure and attributes meaning to this structure. This meaning can be imputed from the actor's subsequent actions and may or may not be consciously attributed.
It is argued here that the ecological conception of information has some similarities with the conventional conception of information. Table 1 shows that Checkland and Holwell's (1998) understanding of how information relates to data in support of action is isomorphic with Gibson's (1979) understanding of how affordances are related to the environment in support of action. Whereas in IS (Checkland and Holwell) , data are the source of information in support of action (all the action that may occur in an organisation), in Gibson's ecological psychology, it is the physical environment of mediums, substances and surfaces that is the source of the information in support of action.
One fundamental difference is that in conventional conceptions of information, the range of possible meanings attributed to any capta, that is the information obtained from that capta, is in principle unconstrained. In contrast, with respect to Gibson's notion of affordances, the range of possible meanings is constrained by the invariant properties of the physical environment. For example, we may be able to sit on a wooden chair, to stand on it, to use it to smash a window, and to burn it to keep warm, but we cannot drink it.
The rest of this article will effectively extend (Table 1 ) through an investigation of other aspects of the environment that exist independently of any particular individual actor and can be a source of information. I begin by extending Gibson's idea of how the physical environment can be a source of information.
6 Beyond capta and the purely physical: the socio-cultural as a source of information 6.1 Social meanings of physical structure As some ecological psychologists explicitly acknowledge (Costall, 1995; Gaver, 1996; Heft, 2001) , objects may have social meanings, that is, shared meanings that arise through use, rather than a consequence of the physical properties of the object. For example, even though a wooden chair may afford burning, ordinarily, chairs are not used as firewood but are used to sit on. Moreover, there may be a social convention as to who can sit on a particular chair. For example, at the beach, a lifesaver's high-chair only affords sitting on by the lifesaver. To use Heft's terminology, the 'immediate affordance' of the chair it that it enables sitting; the 'conventional affordance' is that it marks the sitter as a lifesaver. The information conveyed via this conventional affordance constrains and enables particular actions towards the person sitting in the lifesaver chair.
Hence the way in which the physical environment enables or constrains actions can be to do with the physical structure itself (immediate affordance) or the social meaning of a physical structure (conventional affordance). For example, a lifesaver standing in the shallows may constrain entrance by physically blocking the entrance to the surf (immediate affordance) or through the meaning attributed to his lifesaver uniform (conventional affordance). Although in practice these may be difficult to distinguish, the two are analytically quite different. Immediate affordances can be analysed in terms of
Gibson's physical environment of mediums, substances and surfaces and so far, the discussion of the environment with respect to affordances and routines has been limited to the physical environment. However, conventional affordances clearly involve more than just this physical environment and the individual actor. Schoggen (1989) describes the effect of the social environment (including structures such as roles and norms) on behaviour and shows how social structure is sometimes manifest in physical structures, in particular the built environment. This is one way of understanding conventional affordances. But what exactly is social structure (or the cultural environment)? Although the physical environment was easily characterised by Gibson as consisting of mediums, substances and surfaces, characterising social structure has proved to be a massive sociological undertaking (see Sewell, 1992) . For the purposes of understanding how the socio-cultural environment can convey information, Reed offers a useful characterisation. Reed (1996) theorises the cultural environment in terms of affordances. (Although Reed uses the term 'cultural environment' rather than 'socio-cultural environment', the two are interchangeable for the purposes here.) Reed suggests that children learn about cultural norms through promoted action, whereby some affordances are emphasised and others are forbidden.
Social structure
For Reed, the field of promoted action includes all the affordances made available or emphasized and excludes those affordances forbidden to the child. In this way, he argues that a culture is 'not based on transmission of ideas or habits from one generation to the next. Instead a culture is characterized by a relatively distinct pattern of equilibrium between fields of promoted action and fields of free action ' (1996, p. 186) . This pattern of equilibrium is the prevailing social structure.
Just as the physical environment is comprised of invariants, so the cultural environment is comprised of social structures. These social structures are not invariant in the sense of being fixed, but can be changed as different affordances are emphasised and forbidden. In other words, they have the dual nature of shaping and being shaped by human action (Giddens, 1984) .
When the material is stronger than social fabric
This dual nature of social structure means that social structures do not constrain action in the way that the immediate affordances of physical structures can. For example, in any particular community for those who understand the gender norms of that community, these social structures convey information about acceptable actions. Imagine a community where only men are allowed to surf and women are not allowed to talk to strangers. For those who understand and accept these gender norms, the social structures constrain and enable action. A visitor to this community, who is not familiar with the gender norms, may not pick up this information. This visitor may be able to recognise the different sexes as visually distinct, but not attribute the meaning to these differences that will inform both the visitor's own actions and their actions towards people of a particular sex. In other words, the social structure does not constrain the visitor's actions: a female visitor may choose to surf or to talk to strangers. Moreover, it is possible that a member of the community who understands the system of gender norms may choose not to accept it. In this case, even though the information is still conveyed by the social structure, it does not constrain action.
In contrast, aspects of the physical environment that convey information through some invariant physical property (immediate affordances) rather than through their social meaning, can constrain action. Moreover, they can constrain actions regardless of whether the actor perceives the structure. Even if I do not notice the pole in my path, it constrains my forward movement at the same time as I acquire the information that I should try to go around it.
When constraining action may be more desirable than conveying information
For the purposes of providing information in support of action in a workplace, as long as the goals are taken as given (even explicitly taking into account the fact that different people may have different goals within the same workplace), conveying information is generally sufficient. However, in some cases constraining action may be more desirable. By reducing choice, constraining action may reduce cognitive burden and an actor's error. The following example illustrates this point. The neurotoxin Vincristine is likely to be fatal if injected into the spine. In fact, in Australia, several patients have died from having the neurotoxin Vincristine injected into their spine rather than intravenously. Brien et al ( 2004) discuss how, rather than just relying on labels such as "for intravenous use only", the connections on spinal syringes could be changed so that it is impossible to connect a spinal needle to medications prepared for intravenous use. In this case, the physical structure of the environment (specifically the shape of the syringe) not only conveys information, but it also constrains incorrect actions.
Other aspects of the environment as a source of information
So far, I have carved the environment into the physical and the socio-cultural.
The following section expands the discussion to other aspects of the environment. These other environments ('environment' here used as shorthand for the more precise, but also more cumbersome, term 'aspects of the environment') can also be described in terms of structures -for example the temporal environment as comprised of temporal structures, the political environment as comprised of political structures, the organisational environment being the way an organisation is structured, and so on. Figure 1 attempts a visual depiction of this way of thinking about these different aspects of the environment.
The left panel of (Figure 1 ) depicts actors in the environment. This is similar to James' (1912) notion of 'pure experience' (Heft, 2001 ) encompassing the totality of existence.
The way that actors communicate, and make sense of and navigate the world can be understood in terms of shared conceptual frameworks applied to this world of pure experience. The pyramid in the right panel of (Figure 1 ) represents a conceptual framework comprised of different aspects of the environment -in this case, the physical environment, the socio-cultural environment, the organisational environment and the temporal environment. Actors enrolled in a particular community of practice (Wenger, 1998) , for example a workplace, perceive and attribute meaning to physical structure, organisational structure, social structure and temporal structure. This becomes information in support of action.
Figure 1 Shared conceptual frameworks
There are aspects of the world that clearly fit into a particular category of this conceptual framework. However, in practice, there is also a fair amount of overlapping between the different aspects of the environment. For example, the fact that the manager of an organisation is located on the top floor while the workers are located in the basement is an aspect of the environment that constrains some actions and enables others.
However, it is not at all clear whether the location of the managers and the workers is part of the physical environment, the socio-cultural environment or the organisational environment. It seems to be part of all of them. This is because physical structures are involved (the floors of a building) as well as organisational structures (roles of manager and worker) and social structures (hierarchy between manager and workers). This example indicates the way that, in practice, the different aspects of the environment can be tightly woven together with separation occurring at the conceptual level only.
Organisational environment
Organisational structure includes the way things, people and people and things are organised as well as the values and norms within an organisation. This is similar to what Ciborra and Schneider (1992) refer to as formative contexts. Organisational structure can be conceived of as a smaller and more transient version of social structure -the pattern of equilibrium between fields of promoted action and fields of free action particular to an organisation.
In writing about how people organise space to facilitate an activity, Kirsch (1995) suggests that there are three main categories of organisation: spatial arrangements to simplify choice, spatial arrangements to simplify perception, and spatial arrangements to simplify internal computation. This idea could be extended to how workplaces organise people, utilising formal roles or assigning particular duties to simplify choice, simplify 
Temporal environment
The temporal environment is comprised of temporal structures that convey information about timing. Timetables, opening hours, appointment times, five-day work week, project deadlines, meeting schedules, and just-in-time inventory systems are all examples of temporal structures that help people to accomplish collective routines. As with social and organisational structures, temporal structures have a dual nature: they both shape and are shaped by human action (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002) .
The following example from Johnston et al. (2005) shows how the temporal environment of dispatchers managing the work of technicians could be restructured to make the dispatchers' work more efficient. Dispatchers received phone and SMS communications from technicians and responded to these communications in the order that they arrived. There were three main problems with this. Firstly, there was no regard for priority. Secondly, dispatchers experienced periods of downtime interspersed with periods of intense activity, and these periods of downtime were too fragmented to be used constructively. Thirdly, technicians had to wait on the phone for long periods of time.
Johnston et al conceptualised these problems as stemming from a lack of temporal structure. Part of the solution they proposed involved separating the communications into different types and labelling them so that the dispatchers could respond to the most urgent communications first. This change to the physical structure enabled a change in the temporal structure of the dispatcher's work environment, making their work more manageable.
A typology of information sources
The various types of information source identified in the preceding discussion can be brought together as a tentative typology of information sources in support of action. Table 2 revisits the example of the surfer given at the start of this article, mapping the information sources given in that example to the type of information source identified. 
The difference between representations and structures
These types of information source listed in (Table 2) Actors perceive and attribute meaning to these structures in a particular context. In other words, this type of information source is situated, that is, located physically, temporally and/or socio-culturally. Actors may be sufficiently enrolled in a community of practice to directly perceive the structure or they may rely on labelling. To use a previous example, a theatre technician new to the job may rely on name labels to recognise the anaesthetist, the nurses, and the surgeon. A label is not the same as a representation. The existence of the structure is necessary for the label to be meaningful, just as a warning sign (label) 'cliff edge' is only meaningful if placed near an actual cliff edge. A label helps an actor to perceive a structure as a source of information, whereas a representation is in place of a structure. A representation is understood to be a source of information in itself and is not tied to any particular structure.
Implications for information systems
Which is the best way for the would-be surfer to find a good place to surf? This question cannot be answered without reference to the actor's capabilities and the environment. If the would-be surfer has the skills to visually read the water and likes to subvert existing gender norms then the other sources of information are, perhaps, superfluous. The presence of a lifesaver may be more effective than a red flag but may be more expensive to maintain and so on. The point for information systems design is that rather than the abstract representation (in this case the map and the written description) being the only option considered, a situated approach to system design would use the information source that is most appropriate given the particular context of the actor and the environment.
A situated approach to systems design would also involve taking into account the particular affordances of the various information sources. The same 'type' of information resource may have different affordances. For example, in a work place there may be the option of displaying abstract symbolic data on a whiteboard or a computer screen. While the whiteboard affords shared communication of information, the computer screen affords privacy of information.
However, the word 'design' is a bit misleading when used in reference to information systems and the dangers of being too prescriptive about information systems design are well-documented (B. Fitzgerald, 1996; Wastell, 1996) . Established organisations always have an existing way of doing things, and so have some type of existing system, no matter how crude. Existing infrastructure, skills and the prevailing culture can all place constraints on the type of information system proposed. An IS analyst generally analyses the existing system and submits a proposal for redesign rather than design from scratch. Similarly, when using a situated approach, an analyst aims to restructure the existing environment rather than design environments from scratch. In addition, the analyst who is using a situated approach aims to make use of existing environmental structure. Hence, for the designer with a situated approach, the environment is used as a resource to provide information in support of collective routines, both through making use of existing environmental structure and through restructuring the environment (Johnston et al., 2005) .
Existing information systems that obtain information from the environment
It was claimed at the beginning of the article that conventional information systems are based on abstract representations. This is certainly true for information systems designed using structured methodologies such as SSADM (British Standards Institution, 1994) . Although the environment, particularly the social and organisational environment, has been recognized as crucial in the success or failure of these information systems (Doherty and King, 1998; G. Fitzgerald and Russo, 2005) , the environment has not been recognized as a legitimate part of the information system itself.
This paper has implicitly conceived of an information system as a system that provides information in support of action. The typology (in Table 2 ) can be used to characterise existing information systems that are not comprised solely of abstract representations, in other words, less conventional design approaches which do make use of other information sources. For example, as well as making use of abstract representations, ETHICS (Mumford, 1983) specifically makes use of organisational structure, and possibly social structure as well. Ecological interface design makes use of a type of situated representation. In ecological interface design (Rasmussen and Pejtersen, 1995) , icons are used to represent aspects of the real world. The layout of these icons on a computer screen, rather than in three-dimensional space, conveys additional information to users. As discussed earlier, the Kanban is also a system that relies on situated representations.
The system for assembling air compressors described in Milton et al. (2004) is an example of an information system that relies on physical structures, immediate affordances in the physical environment. In assembly, the air-compressor acts as its own jig. Through hiding and highlighting affordances (Kirsch, 1995) , the structure conveys to the assembler what the next piece should be and where it should go. Hence, there is no need for a manual explaining how to assemble the air compressor.
When should information systems go 'wild'?
This paper is not advocating that all information systems should discard abstract representations and just obtain information from the environment. However, it suggests that IS designers need to consider cases when it may be more efficient or effective to obtain information directly from the environment, rather than rely on a representation.
The example involving syringe design for administration of a neurotoxin, showed how the environment can be structured to reduce the cognitive burden for actors and so reduce human error, in this case preventing potentially fatal mistakes. Waller et al. (2007) have shown how, in a hospital context, making use of structures in the environment can increase efficiency by reducing the time and effort nurses spend searching for the information they need to treat a patient. As a consequence, the nurses have more time to attend to the needs of the patients and more time for professional development and liaison. In other words, the nurses can be more effective. Milton et al. (2004) use the examples of the Kanban system and the jig for assembling air compressors to suggest that situated systems can achieve a level of simplicity and effectiveness that cannot be achieved through conventional IS design.
Just as Hutchin's theory of distributed cognition extends the idea of what is cognitive to include interactions with people and the environment (Hollan et al., 2000) , (Hutchins, 1995) , so we can conceive of situated information systems 'in the wild' rather than confined to computational space.
Developments in HCI that have the potential to contribute to information systems 'in the wild'
In HCI there has long been a recognition that the computer should not be solely conceived of as abstract representations accessed and manipulated via a keyboard. In particular, physical structures in the environment have been recognised as an important source of information. In his book on design, Norman (1988) discusses how physical affordances make it cognitively easier for a user to know how to use an artefact.
Exploiting physical affordances is also essential in Weiser's (1993) vision of ubiquitous computing, whereby computing artefacts seamlessly integrate with human activities.
Streitz and Nixon characterise ubiquitous computing as allowing users to 'discover the necessary information from the environment to achieve a defined goal or complete an activity '(2005, p. 35) .
Recent technological developments in HCI have seen increased mobility of computing devices. Combined with new approaches such as tangible computing and pervasive computing, these developments offer untapped potential for effective application to situated information systems, providing new technological means for obtaining information from the physical environment.
Pervasive computing (Lyytinen and Yoo, 2002 ) is where computers embedded in the environment dynamically obtain information from that environment to update their models. This has conceptual similarities to situated systems. Whereas in situated systems, the human actor perceives structures in the environment and acts accordingly, one could think of the computers as non-human actors (Latour, 1987) , and conceptualise pervasive computing as where the computer perceives structures in the environment and acts accordingly.
Tangible computing involves putting digital information into physical form. As well as enabling physical manipulation of digital information, tangible computing can be understood as a move from abstract representations to situated representations. For example, in the Marble Answering Machine, each message is represented by a real marble and the location of the marbles informs the user how many messages have arrived (Ullmer et al., 2005) .
In addition to these approaches that make use of physical structures in the environment, there are various approaches in HCI that explicitly recognise social structures as a source of information for actors. Dourish (2004) refers to these approaches as 'social computing' and there is much from these approaches that could be applied to situated information systems design.
Conclusion
This paper has identified and analysed various types of structure in the environment that can be a source of information for actors involved in accomplishing a collective routine. The point for information systems design is that rather than the abstract representation being the only option considered, the information source(s) should be used that is/are most appropriate given the particular context of a particular actor and a particular environment. More research is needed into when and why different types of information source are most appropriate or effective. There is scope for much productive dialogue between IS and HCI regarding the potential of approaches such as social computing, pervasive computing and tangible computing for application to information systems design.
